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1Combinatorial Design of Secure Lightweight
Data Dispersal Schemes
(Work in Progress)
Seyit Camtepe, Yu-Chu Tian, Dhammika Jayalath, Josef Pieprzyk
Abstract—Dispersing a data object into a set of data shares is an elemental stage in distributed communication and storage
systems. In comparison to data replication, data dispersal with redundancy saves space and bandwidth. Moreover, dispersing a
data object to distinct communication links or storage sites limits adversarial access to whole data and tolerates loss of a part
of data shares. Existing data dispersal schemes have been proposed mostly based on various mathematical transformations on
the data which induce high computation overhead. This paper presents a novel data dispersal scheme where each part of a data
object is replicated, without encoding, into a subset of data shares according to combinatorial design theory. Particularly, data
parts are mapped to points and data shares are mapped to lines of a projective plane. Data parts are then distributed to data
shares using the point and line incidence relations in the plane so that certain subsets of data shares collectively possess all
data parts. The presented scheme incorporates combinatorial design theory with inseparability transformation to achieve secure
data dispersal at reduced computation, communication and storage costs. Rigorous formal analysis and experimental study
demonstrate significant cost-benefits of the presented scheme in comparison to existing methods.
Index Terms—data dispersal, combinatorial design, distributed storage, multi-path and multi-link communications, security
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1 INTRODUCTION
Data dispersal algorithms divide a data object (e.g.,
data stream, files, emails or raw data) into smaller
data shares with or without redundancy. As apposed
to data replication, data dispersal schemes adjust the
redundancy level for improved space efficiency and
security. For example, data persistence solutions for
wireless networks of resource limited sensors store
shares of the sensed data redundantly on a set of
sensors [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Distributed storage
systems such as Napster, Gnutella, Freenet, BitTor-
rent, eMule, SURFnet, PAST and LOCKSS use overlay
networks to interconnect a large number of users
who voluntarily store data shares. Wireless devices
equipped with smart antennas use beamforming to
establish multiple links for simultaneous transmission
of data shares [7]. Likewise, in multi-hop communi-
cation networks, data shares are transmitted through
disjoint paths between source and destination node
pairs using dispersity routing [8], [9]. In all these sce-
narios, data dispersal prevents single point of failures,
compensates loss of data shares, and enforces security
by increasing the number of data shares needed to be
compromised to access the data object.
Existing dispersal schemes decompose a data object
into redundant shares through various complex math-
ematical transformations: erasure codes (EC) [10], [11],
[12], [13], Shamir’s threshold sharing [14], LT codes
[15], [16], network coding (NC) [17], [18], [19] and
modular coding based on Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT) [20], [21], [22]. For example, it has been shown
in [23] that Shamir’s threshold sharing is approxi-
mately 20 times slower than AES encryption [24].
Multiple assignment scheme (MAS) [25], [26] is the
only existing solution that can disperse a data object
by replicating its parts. However, it has a severe space
blow-up problem. Existing data dispersal schemes
may work fine on small data objects having kilobytes
of sizes. However, they are very inefficient when the
data object size grows to megabytes or gigabytes
which is a quite common case in today’s computing
and communication systems.
The main contribution of this paper is a combina-
torial data dispersal (CDD) scheme which replicates
parts of a data object into data shares. CDD uses point
and line incidence relations from a projective plane
PG(2,q) [27], [28] to decide the set of data shares to
replicate each data part to so that only a subset of data
shares is sufficient to reconstruct the data object. CDD
maps points and lines of a projective plane PG(2,q)
to data parts and data shares, respectively. If a point
lies on a line in PG(2,q), then the corresponding data
part is replicated in the data share associated with the
line. CDD can process data object word by word (e.g.,
64, 128 or 256 bits); therefore, it is suitable for a data
stream. CDD ensures data confidentiality by using
XOR encryption due to Multiple Assignment Scheme
(MAS) [25] [26] where each data word is split as
XOR of multiple data parts, or inseparable encryption
transformation (a.k.a. all-or-nothing transformation)
[29].
This paper provides algorithms for data disper-
sal, retrieval, repair, update and delete. It formally
2analyzes and experimentally evaluates the overhead
(storage, computation and communication) of CDD
and the existing data dispersal methods. The security
of CDD with XOR encryption or inseparable encryp-
tion transformation is also evaluated against single
or a set of colluding adversaries. It is shown that
CDD has low overhead, and it disperses and retrieves
data objects 2 to 1200 times faster than the existing
schemes. CDD addresses the need for a scalable and
lightweight data dispersal scheme that can efficiently
handle large data objects in resource limited networks
and time critical communication systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations used
throughout this paper are listed in Table 1. Section 2
introduces the system model and preliminaries. Com-
binatorial data dispersal, retrieval, repair, update and
delete algorithms are presented in Section 3. Section 4
provides a formal analysis for the presented solution.
Related work is presented in Section 5 and existing
solutions are compared with the presented solution.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Our system model consists of v channels. A channel
represents a link (or a path) between a node pair in a
communication network or a data storage site. A data
object is a collection of data parts (i.e., a sequence
of one or more words of sizes 64, 128 or 256 bits)
corresponding to a data stream (e.g., video, voice or
sensor measurements) or a data block (e.g., files or
databases). A data object can be generated by one or
a set of collaborating data sources.
The combinatorial data dispersal scheme presented
in this paper divides a data object into data parts,
which are then dispersed redundantly into v data
shares, each to be put on a separate channel, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Retrieval of a data object requires
at least k data shares from k channels. Equivalently,
missing data shares due to a failing channel can only
be recovered by accessing at least k other data shares.
Our data dispersal model consists of five basic oper-
ations: disperse, retrieve, repair, update and delete. It
is assumed that a group of collaborating adversaries
can retrieve data shares from at most k   1 channels.
Adversaries can delete data shares on up to v   k
channels.
The combinatorial dispersal scheme builds upon
Finite Projective Plane which is a subset of Symmetric
BIBD (Balanced Incomplete Block Design).
Definition 1 (Symmetric BIBD [27]): A Balanced In-
complete Block Design (BIBD) is an arrangement of
v distinct objects into b sets such that:
 each object is in exactly r distinct sets
 each set contains exactly k distinct objects
 every pair of distinct objects is in exactly  sets
The BIBD is expressed as (v; b; r; k; ) where b  k =
v r and  (v 1) = r (k 1) . The BIBD is called
Fig. 1: Combinatorial data dispersal system model.
Symmetric BIBD (a.k.a., Symmetric Design, SBIBD or
(v; k; )) when b = v and r = k [27] with an additional
requirement that:
 every pair of blocks intersects on exactly  ob-
jects.
Similarly, a Finite Projective Plane consists of points
and lines of a Projective Space PG(2; q) of dimension
2 and order q. For each prime power q where q 
2, there exists a Finite Projective Plane of order q [28,
Theorem 2.10] with the following four properties:
 there are exactly v = q2 + q + 1 points
 there are exactly b = q2 + q + 1 lines
 every line contains exactly k = q + 1 points
 every point occurs on exactly r = q + 1 lines
 every pair of lines intersects on exactly one point
 every pair of points lies on exactly one line
Thus, a Finite Projective Plane of order q is a SBIBD
with parameters (v; k; ) = (q2 + q + 1; q + 1; 1) [27].
Example 1 ((7,3,1) - SBIBD): Consider (v; k; ) =
(7; 3; 1) Symmetric BIBD with the following two equiv-
alent interpretations:
 Let f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g be 7 points of the design.
Then, there are 7 lines where each line contains
3 points as follows, or
 Let f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g be 7 lines of the design. Then,
there are 7 points where 3 lines intersect on each
point as follows:
f0; 1; 2g0, f0; 3; 4g1, f0; 5; 6g2, f1; 3; 5g3,
f1; 4; 6g4, f2; 3; 6g5, f2; 4; 5g6.
Additionally, every pair of points lies on exactly one
line and every pair of lines intersects on exactly one
point.
In this work, each data part is mapped to a unique
point, and each data share is mapped to a unique line
in a projective space. Hence, a data part is assigned
to a data share if the corresponding point and line
are incident to each other. For realization of this solu-
tion, two methods are presented to construct (v; k; )-
SBIBD. An SBIBD is generated once for each (k; v)
values and can be used for multiple data object. Once
generated, v! isomorphic SBIBDs can be obtained by
simply renaming the points in the design. The first
3TABLE 1: Notations
Notation Description Notation Description
2fS0;:::;Sv 1g All subsets of the set fS0; : : : ; Sv 1g MC Modular coding using CRT
A Authorized access structure NC Network Coding
b Number of data parts (q2 + q + 1) Pj jth data part (0  i < v)
C Confidentiality transformation P setj Set of k data shares possessing part Pj
ci i
th (C)-transformed word PG(2; q) Projective geometry of order q [27]
CDD Combinatorial Data Dispersal q A prime or prime power
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem r = q + 1 Number of data shares possessing a data part
d Luby Transform code degree RAND(1; s) s Data object size in words jSj = s+ 1
D Combinatorial transformation S Input data object
EC Symmetric cipher for C S0 Dispersed data object
EI XOR Encryption for I Si ith data share (0  i < v)
EC Erasure Codes Sseti Set of k data parts possessed by data share Si
I Inseparability transformation ti ith (C, I)-transformed word
IV Initialization vector (v; k; ) Symmetric BIBD from PG(2; q) [27]
KC Symmetric key for C v Number of data shares (q2 + q + 1)
KI Optional user supplied key for I wi ith data object word (0  i  s)
k = q + 1 Number of data parts per data share fxjexpr(x)g the set of all x such that expr(x) is true
LT Luby Transform X Unauthorized access structure
m = s+1
v
Number of words per data part  Data parts possessed by two data shares
MAS Multiple Access Structures  Number of LT codes per data share
generation method is the Difference Set Method, which
uses a simple modular addition operation on a Cyclic
Difference Set. The second method is Orthogonal Latin
Squares, which can be used for large designs.
Definition 2 (Cyclic Difference Set): A cyclic (v; k; )
difference set (mod v) is a set B = fp1; p2; : : : ; pkg
of distinct elements in Zv such that each of (v   1)
elements can be expressed as pi   pj (mod v) in 
different ways [27, Definition 2.1.1].
Given the cyclic difference set, SBIBD blocks can be
constructed as B;B+1; B+2; : : : ; B+(v  1) (mod v)
[27, Theorem 2.1.3] in O(v).
Example 2: Difference set f1; 2; 4g can be used to gen-
erate (7; 3; 1) SBIBD with blocks: f1; 2; 4g0, f2; 3; 5g1,
f3; 4; 6g2, f4; 5; 0g3, f5; 6; 1g4, f6; 0; 2g5, f0; 1; 3g6.
This design is isomorphic to the design in Example
1. Replacing 0) 4, 1) 0, 2) 1 and 4) 2 results in
the design of Example 1. The difference set method
provides an efficient construction, which can be used
on resource limited devices if a cyclic difference set
is known for the target design. In fact, cyclic difference
sets for small designs are listed in [27]. A complete set
of (q   1) Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares (MOLS)
can be used to construct larger (q2 + q + 1; q + 1; 1)
Symmetric Designs in O(v3=2) as described in [30].
3 COMBINATORIAL DATA DISPERSAL
3.1 Overview of the Scheme
Combinatorial Data Dispersal (CDD) scheme consists
of three transformation functions hC; I;Di which are
applied to an input data object at two stages: insep-
arable encryption transformation hC; Ii for confiden-
tiality and combinatorial dispersal hDi for reliability.
CDD first divides an input data object S with s words
(w0; : : : ; ws 1) into v data parts (P0; : : : ; Pv 1). Next
it maps data parts to v data shares (S0; : : : ; Sv 1) as
illustrated in Fig. 2, where (S) is an input data object
(a sequence of words), (C) is a confidentiality transfor-
mation algorithm (a.k.a., symmetric encryption where
the key is dispersed along with the encrypted data)
with a large random symmetric encryption key KC ,
(I) is an inseparability transformation algorithm with
XOR Encryption or a symmetric encryption with a
user supplied short key KI , (D) is a dispersal scheme
based on the projective geometry PG(2; q) (dimension
2, order q), and (S 0) is the output dispersed data as a
set of subsets of data parts where each subset of data
parts constitutes a data share.
Definition 3 (Monotone Access Structures): Consider
the set fS0; : : : ; Sv 1g of v data shares. A collection
A  2fS0;:::;Sv 1g is said to be monotone, for every
A 2 A, if there exists a B such that A  B then
B 2 A. An authorized access structure is a monotone
collection of A  2fS0;:::;Sv 1g non-empty sets where
each set in A corresponds to a list of data shares
to be accessed to reconstruct the input data object.
Any sets not in A are considered to be in X , the
unauthorized access structure. Note also that for
every A 2 X , if there exists B such that B  A then
B 2 X . This means that if the shares in A cannot
provide sufficient data parts to reconstruct an input
data object, then the shares in the set B  A cannot
as well.
CDD uses block design techniques from combi-
natorial design theory to decide which data share
to possess which data parts. No single data share
possesses the whole data object, the data object can be
constructed by accessing only an authorized set A 2 A
of data shares, and failure of a subset of data shares
B 2 X (i.e., storage site crash or communication link
failure) can be compensated. It is computationally
infeasible for an adversary to determine cleartext
content of the data object without collecting sufficient
4number of data shares.
The following subsections describe dispersal, re-
trieval, repair, update and delete processes. The fol-
lowing common numerical example will be used for
illustration of our algorithms throughout the paper.
Example 3: Assume that there are v = 7 channels as
illustrated in Fig. 1 and s = 13 words fw0 : : : w12g will
be dispersed at each round. There are v = 7 data parts
fP0 : : : P6g, each part consists of s+1v = 2 words, and
each data share possesses k = 3 parts.
3.2 Data Dispersal
The data dispersal process transforms a data object
into inseparable and confidential data parts at Stage
1 so that decryption of even one data part requires
possession of all others. It then disperses these data
parts redundantly into data shares at Stage 2 so that
only an authorized set of k or more data shares can
reconstruct the data object, and possessing k  1 data
shares does not reveal any information. A sample
application scenario can be dispersing personal files
on public or cloud storage systems which are ad-
ministered by distinct competing organizations and
physically located in separate countries. While confi-
dentiality ensures that a storage site cannot extract
any partial information from the data parts that it
possesses, inseparability ensures that the confidential-
ity key dispersed along with the data object cannot
be recovered unless all data parts are accessed from
k or more data shares. An optional key, which is
kept by data owners and possibly derived from a
password, assures that the confidentiality key can
only be recovered by the data owners. Dispersal of the
unique confidentiality key along with the data object
ensures its availability and removes the key man-
agement requirements. Similar discussions apply in
communication scenarios where a critical data object
is dispersed from source through disjoint links/paths
to a destination. The overall dispersal algorithm is
detailed in Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Fig. 2 based
on numerical values of Examples 1, 3 and 5.
Stage 1: Inseparable Encryption Transformation
Existing data dispersal schemes, except Shamir’s
sheme, can ensure data confidentiality by encrypting
a data object using a sufficiently large key. The key
is then dispersed along with the data object using
Shamir’s scheme [31], [32]. Alternatively, XOR en-
cryption splits each data part into multiple random
data parts as Pi = (Pi1  Pi2  : : :). XOR encryption
reduces the computational complexity but causes stor-
age blow-up problem.
Similar to AONT-RS [33], CDD can provide strong
security by using inseparable encryption transforma-
tion based on All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT) [29]
as illustrated in Fig. 2 and Algorithm 1 (lines 2-
11). First, each input data word w0; : : : ; ws 1 passes
through confidentiality transformation C with a suf-
ficiently large random symmetric encryption key KC
( 128Bits) and a symmetric block cipher EC .
Next, inseparability transformation I adds (xor)
transformed words ci to KC and stores the result
as sth transformed word cs = KC  c0  : : :  cs 1.
Alternatively, if the user supplies a short key KI , sth
transformed word can be cs = KC  EI [KI ; c0  0]
: : :  EI [KI ; cs 1  (s   1)]. Overall transformation
using different block cipher modes of operations [34]
in C transformations is listed below. Cipher-Block
Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output
Feedback (OFB) modes require IV (Initialization Vec-
tor) is dispersed along with the data object as the
transformed word cs 1 where c 1 = cs 1 = IV =
Random() and 0  i < s   1. When Electronic
Code-Book (ECB) and Counter (CTR) modes are used,
there is no need for an IV and i below is set to be
(0  i  s  1).
Type Transformation
CECB ci = EC [KC ; wi]
CCBC ci = EC [KC ; wi  ci 1]
CCFB ci = wi  EC [KC ; ci 1]
COFB ci = wi  EiC [KC ; IV ]
CCTR ci = wi  EC [KC ; i]
I cs = KC  c0  : : : cs 1
Example 4: Given a data object with 13 words
fw0; : : : ; w12g and confidentiality key KC , inseparable
encryption transformation first generates transformed
words c0; : : : ; c12 by using one of the confidentiality
transformation methods C from the table above. When
CCounter is selected, ci = wiEC [KC ; i] for (0  i  12).
Finally, inseparability transformation I generates the
transformed word c13 = KC  c0  : : :  c12 as
formulated in Algorithm 1 steps 5 to 11 and illustrated
in Fig. 2.
The inseparable encryption transformation scheme
requires KC , IV (for CBC, CFB or OFB modes) and
data word ci sizes are the same. EC is a symmetric
cipher such as AES, Blowfish, DES, IDEA, RC5 and
TEA. Data word size should be an integer multiple
of the input block size of EC so that each data word
can be further divided into blocks to be encrypted
individually. For example, KC , IV , data word and
input block sizes can all be 128 bits using AES.
Blowfish requires 64 bits input blocks in which case
KC , IV and data word sizes can all be 64  z bits
where 1  z  7. In a similar manner, RC5 requires
128 bits input blocks in which case KC , IV and data
word sizes can all be 128  z bits where 1  z  15.
IDEA and TEA require 64 bits input blocks and permit
KC , IV and data word sizes to be 128 bits
While EC using KC provides confidentiality for
each dispersed data part and prevents extraction of
partial information, EI using KI protects the whole
data object even when all data parts are accessed
by somebody other than the data owner. Unlike KC ,
5KI is not dispersed along with the data object. It is
considered to be an easy to remember key, possibly
derived from a password. It is possible to choose dif-
ferent symmetric ciphers for EC and EI , but selected
data word size should also be an integer multiple of
the input block size for EI . EI can be an encryption
algorithm which accepts a variable size key such as
Blowfish (input block size 64 bits, key size 32-448
bits) and RC5 (input block size 128 bits, key size 0-
2040 bits). In this case, KI can be selected to have an
arbitrary size.
Stage 2: Combinatorial Data Dispersal
Combinatorial design characterizes the way parts of
a data object are distributed to a set of data shares.
Data parts and data shares are mapped to points and
lines of a finite projective plane. If a point lies on a
line, then the data part corresponding to the point is
assigned to the data share associated with the line.
Given v data shares and v data parts, a data source
first generates a PG(2,q), a (v; k; )-SBIBD, with v lines
and v points. Next, a data source applies following
mappings:
 each data part is mapped to a point i,
 each data share is mapped to a line j,
 a data part Pi is assigned to a data share Sj if
Sj 2 P seti where P seti = fSj j point i lies on line
j in PG(2; q)g (the set of all lines passing from
the point i; equivalently, the set of all data shares
possessing the data part Pi),
 a data share Sj receives a data part Pi if Pi 2 Ssetj
where Ssetj = fPij point i lies on line j in
PG(2; q)g (the set of all points on the line j;
equivalently, the set of all data parts possessed
by the data share Sj), and
 each P seti (0  i < v) is an element of the
authorized access structure A implying that the
parts stored on this set of data shares can be
accessed to reconstruct the data object.
Moreover, due to the symmetry of SBIBD, Sj 2 P seti
if and only if Pi 2 Ssetj for (0  i; j < v).
The set of all data shares possessing a specific data
part forms an element of the authorized access struc-
ture A because these shares collectively possess all
data parts. This is due to the property of underlying
projective geometry where a point pairs with each
other points exactly once on exactly one line. As a
result, the set of all lines that pass through a point
should also pass through all other points. Hence, we
have the following three properties:
Property 1: An authorized access structure A con-
sists of the sets P seti (the set of all data shares pos-
sessing the data part Pi) for (0  i < v) and their
supersets:
A = fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1g [ f8AjP seti  A ^ (0  i < v)g:
Note also that, X = 2fS0;:::;Sv 1g n A.
Property 2: A 2 A if and only if ffS0; : : : ; Sv 1g n
Ag 2 X : If A 2 A, there exists a part Pi which is
possessed by all the data shares Sj 2 A. The data
shares in ffS0; : : : ; Sv 1g n Ag do not possess at least
the part Pi. Hence, ffS0; : : : ; Sv 1gnAg 2 X . If B 2 X ,
there exists at least one part Pi (0  i < v) where
all k data shares possessing part Pi are not in B;
therefore, these data shares are in ffS0; : : : ; Sv 1gnBg,
and ffS0; : : : ; Sv 1g n Bg 2 A. This property follows
the symmetry of the underlying design.
Property 3: jAj = jX j = 2v   1: This is the direct
result of the previous property and the fact that X =
f2fS0;:::;Sv 1g n Ag.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the overall combinatorial
data dispersal scheme. Inseparable encryption trans-
formation (Stage 1) is applied to the input data words
through lines 5 to 11. If CBC, CFB or OFB modes
are used, the transformed word cs 1 skips the line
9 and stores the cleartext IV . Transformed words are
appended to the data parts in line 12. Through lines 13
to 17, data parts are assigned to data shares based on
the underlying Symmetric BIBD. Built upon Examples
1, 3, 4 and 5, Fig. 2 illustrates the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Combinatorial Data Dispersal
1: function DISPERSE(v; k; s)
2: m s+1v . words per data part
3: [D]: fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1g . mapping
4: KC  Random() . random encryption key
5: cs  KC . disperse the key with data
6: for i 0; s do
7: if i < s then
8: Wait for the arrival of word wi
9: [C]: ci  C(KC ; wi) . encrypt the word
10: [I]: cs  cs  ci . encrypt KC
11: end if
12: [D]: Pb im c  Pb im cjjci . append the word
13: if b imc < b i+1m c then
14: for all shares Si 2 P setb im c do
15: [D]: Si  SijjPb im c . replicate
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
19: end function
Example 5: Consider the (7,3,1)-SBIBD given in
Example 1. Inseparable encryption transformation
converts input data object into 14 words c0; : : : ; c13.
A data source organizes these 14 words into 7 data
parts (P0; : : : ; P6) by merging every two consecutive
words into one data part as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Next, the data source assigns each data part to a
data share based on the (7,3,1)-SBIBD as follows:
6Fig. 2: Combinatorial Data Dispersal: s = 13 data
object words are dispersed to v = 7 data shares
fS0; : : : ; S6g (Examples 4 and 5).
P set0 = fS0; S1; S2g: assign part P0 to shares S0,S1,S2
P set1 = fS0; S3; S4g: assign part P1 to shares S0,S3,S4
P set2 = fS0; S5; S6g: assign part P2 to shares S0,S5,S6
P set3 = fS1; S3; S5g: assign part P3 to shares S1,S3,S5
P set4 = fS1; S4; S6g: assign part P4 to shares S1,S4,S6
P set5 = fS2; S3; S6g: assign part P5 to shares S2,S3,S6
P set6 = fS2; S4; S5g: assign part P6 to shares S2,S4,S5
That means, each data share possesses the following
data parts:
Sset0 = fP0; P1; P2g: share S0 contains parts P0,P1,P2
Sset1 = fP0; P3; P4g: share S1 contains parts P0,P3,P4
Sset2 = fP0; P5; P6g: share S2 contains parts P0,P5,P6
Sset3 = fP1; P3; P5g: share S3 contains parts P1,P3,P5
Sset4 = fP1; P4; P6g: share S4 contains parts P1,P4,P6
Sset5 = fP2; P3; P6g: share S5 contains parts P2,P3,P6
Sset6 = fP2; P4; P5g: share S6 contains parts P2,P4,P5
Hence, the authorized access structure is the mono-
tone setA = fP set0 ; : : : ; P set6 ; : : :gwhere (A 2 A)^(A 
B) implies that B 2 A. Any element of A is a
set of data shares which can be accessed to collect
all the data parts sufficient to reconstruct the data
object. For example, let us pick P set3 = fS1; S3; S5g.
The data parts possessed by these data shares are
S1[S3[S5 = fP0; P3; P4; P1; P5; P2; P6g. Note also that
the data parts possessed by any pair of data shares are
not sufficient to reconstruct the data object.
3.3 Data Retrieval
The data retrieval process is reverse of the data dis-
persal process. It collects all data parts from an autho-
rized set of data shares at Stage 1. Once all data parts
are retrieved, inseparable decryption transformation
at Stage 2 is applied to reconstruct the original data
object. The overall retrieval algorithm is detailed in
Algorithm 2 and illustrated in Fig. 3 based on the
numerical values of Examples 1, 3, 6 and 7.
Stage 1: Combinatorial Data Retrieval
The dispersed retrieval scheme selects an ele-
ment of the authorized access structure A =
fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1; : : :g to identify a set of data shares
to access so that all data object parts can be re-
trieved. Each element, such as P seti (jP seti j  k),
contains names of at least k data shares, each data
share contains k data parts, and data shares in P seti
collectively possesses all data parts fPij(0  i <
v)^ (P seti 2 A)^ (Sj 2 P seti )^ (Pi 2 Ssetj )g required to
reconstruct the input data object. Note that the total of
k2 > v parts can be retrieved from k data shares, one
part is repeated in k shares. Once data parts are re-
trieved, v data parts are split into s transformed words
[c0; : : : ; cs]. The overall dispersed retrieval algorithm
is illustrated in Example 6, Fig. 3 and Algorithm 2
(lines 2-7).
Example 6: Consider the data dispersal scheme as
illustrated in Fig. 2 and Example 5. Given the au-
thorized access structure A = fP set0 ; : : : ; P set6 ; : : : g,
the retrieval algorithm picks P set1 and retrieves all
data shares in P set1 = fS0; S3; S4g. Note that P set1
means all data shares that contain data part P1. Due
to the properties of the underlying design theory,
part P1 must be paired with all other parts at least
once in these data shares. By accessing all data shares
possessing P1, data object parts Sset0 = fP0; P1; P2g,
Sset3 = fP1; P3; P5g, Sset4 = fP1; P4; P6g are retrieved.
Stage 2: Inseparable Decryption Transformation
The key KC is constructed by adding (xor) the words
(c0; : : : ; cs 1) to cs (Algorithm 2, lines 8-11). Finally,
data words w0; w1; : : : ; ws 1 are obtained by perform-
ing reverse confidentiality transformation C  with the
KC (Algorithm 2, lines 12-14) using the proper block
cipher modes of operations listed below. CBC, CFB
and OFB modes require IV is retrieved from the
transformed word cs 1 where c 1 = IV = cs 1 and
0  i < s   1 (Algorithm 2, line 12). When ECB and
CTR modes are used, i is set to be (0  i  s  1).
Type Transformation
I  KC = c0  : : : cs 1  cs
C ECB wi = DC [KC ; ci]
C CBC wi = DC [KC ; ci] ci 1
C CFB wi = ci  EC [KC ; ci 1]
C OFB wi = ci  EiC [KC ; IV ]
C CTR wi = ci  EC [KC ; i]
Example 7: Following the result of Example 6, data
parts fP0; P1; P2; P3; P4; P5; P6g are split into trans-
formed words fc0; : : : ; c13g. As illustrated in Fig. 3
and Algorithm 2 (lines 2-7), inverse inseparability
transformation is applied to obtain the key KC =
c0: : :c13. Following the choice C Counter of Example
4, inverse confidentiality transformation is applied as
wi = ci  EC [KC ; i] (0  i  12) to obtain the original
data object words S = fw0; : : : ; w12g.
7Algorithm 2 Combinatorial Data Retrieval
1: function RETRIEVE(v; k; s)
2: [D ]: A  fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1; : : :g
3: a Random(v) such that P seta 2 A . pick an
authorized set of data shares from the authorized
access structure A
4: for all shares Si 2 P seta do
5: Retrieve k data parts contained in Si
6: end for
7: [c0; : : : ; cs] [P0; : : : ; Pv 1] . get data words
8: for i 0; s do
9: [I ]: cs  cs  ci . decrypt the key
10: end for
11: KC  cs . retrieve the key
12: for i 0; s do
13: [C ]: wi  C (KC ; ci) . decrypt words
14: end for
15: end function
Fig. 3: Combinatorial Data Retrieval: s = 13 data
object words are retrieved from k shares (Examples
6 and 7).
3.4 Data Repair
It is possible that a data share is partially or fully
deleted or corrupted due to communication failures,
bandwidth limitations, storage failures, storage poli-
cies or time limitations. Our scheme can repair loss
of k   1 data shares. A data source may use the
list fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1g to check if parts fP0; : : : ; Pv 1g
are missing or corrupted. Detection and repair of
corrupted data shares require each data part to be
extended with a keyed-hash using a user supplied
keyKI after line 13 of Algorithm 1. These hash values
can be checked in line 5 of Algorithm 2 during data
retrieval. (1) Assume that part Pl from data share Si is
deleted or corrupted. Then, the data source randomly
picks one of the other k   1 data shares from the set
P setl nfSig, retrieve the missing part and assign it back
to the data share Si. (2) Assume that all data parts of
a data share Si are deleted or corrupted. Then, each
Fig. 4: Combinatorial Data Repair: a failed data share
S0 with missing data parts fP0; P1; P2g is repaired
using k other shares (Example 8).
such data part Pl 2 Sseti can be retrieved from one of
the data shares in P setl n fSig as described above.
Example 8: Assume that data share S0 is either par-
tially or fully deleted as illustrated in Fig. 4. The data
source first identifies which parts are inaccessible by
checking Sset0 = fP0; P1; P2g. Next, the data source
collects missing parts as follows: (i) part P0 can be
retrieved from one of the data shares P set0 n fS0g =
fS1; S2g, (ii) part P1 can be retrieved from one of
the data shares P set1 n fS0g = fS3; S4g, and (iii) part
P2 can be retrieved from one of the data shares
P set2 n fS0g = fS5; S6g. Data source selects S1, S3 and
S5 to collect missing parts and constructs a new data
share S0 as illustrated in Fig. 4.
3.5 Data Update
Following the dispersal of a data object, there may be
a need to update an individual data object word, say
wi. IfKC is unknown, once for the first update, all data
parts in k data shares need to be retrieved in order
to recover the key KC . If the inseparable encryption
transformation is done by using ECB, OFB or CTR
block cipher modes of operations, it is sufficient to
update data parts corresponding to transformed data
words ci and cs only, as outlined in Algorithm 3 (lines
6-11). Assume that w0i represents the updated word.
New transformed words will be c0i = C(KC ; w0i) and
c0s = cs ci c0i. If CBC or CFB block cipher modes of
operations are used, then inseparability I and con-
fidentiality C transformations affect all transformed
data words c0i; c
0
i+1; : : : ; c
0
s. Therefore, all relevant data
parts need to be updated as outlined in Algorithm 3
(lines 12-21).
3.6 Data Delete
A straightforward way is to delete all v data shares.
Alternatively, randomly selecting an element of the
authorized access structure A = fP set0 ; : : : ; P setv 1; : : :g
and deleting the set of k data shares referred by this
element makes the data object inaccessible. A 2 A
means that there exists a part Pi which is possessed by
all the data shares Sj 2 A but no others. Thus, deleting
these data shares means deleting all occurrences of
8Algorithm 3 Combinatorial Data Update
1: function UPDATE(v; k; s; w0i)
2: /* w0i: new i
th word */
3: Algorithm 2, Lines 2 - 11
4: m s+1v . words per part
5: (: : : jjc0s) Pv 1 . encrypted key
6: if ECB,OFB or CTR then
7: [C]: c0i  C(KC ; w0i) . encrypt word
8: [I]: c0s  c0s  ci  c0i . re-encrypt key
9: [D]: P 0b im c  (: : : jjc
0
ijj : : :) . new data part
10: [D]: PartUpdate(P 0b im c, b
i
mc)
11: end if
12: if CBC or CFB then
13: for j  i; s  2 do . (cs 1; cs)=(IV;KC)
14: [C]: c0j  C(KC ; wj) . encrypt the word
15: [I]: c0s  c0s  cj  c0j . re-encrypt key
16: [D]: P 0b jm c  (: : : jjcj) . new data part
17: if b jmc < b j+1m c then
18: [D]: PartUpdate(P 0b jm c, b
j
mc)
19: end if
20: end for
21: end if
22: [D]: P 0v 1  (: : : jjc0s) . update last data part
23: [D]: PartUpdate(P 0v 1, v   1)
24: end function
25: function PARTUPDATE(P 0i , i)
26: for all shares Sj 2 P seti do
27: [D]: Pi 2 Sj  P 0i
28: end for
29: end function
the part Pi. In such a scenario, inseparable encryption
transformation will prevent retrieval of the data object
or any part of it.
Example 9: Consider the data dispersal scheme as
illustrated in Fig. 2 and Example 5. Given the au-
thorized access structure A = fP set0 ; : : : ; P set6 ; : : : g,
the data delete algorithm picks an element, say P set1 ,
and removes all data shares in P set1 = fS0; S3; S4g.
Note that P set1 means all data shares that contain
data part P1. Inseparable encryption transformation
ensures that, in the absence of data part P1, the data
object cannot be retrieved.
4 ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION
4.1 Space Complexity
The result of the inseparable encryption transforma-
tion is s data words (c0; : : : ; cs) partitioned into v
data parts where each data part contains m = s+1v
data words. Each data part is then assigned to k data
shares, and each data share possesses k data parts.
Hence, the space complexity for a data object with s
words is O(ks) words.
Dispersed storage (Algorithm 1) processes input
data object (or a data stream) word by word. At each
iteration, the input word wi, maximum m = s+1v
transformed data words belonging to the data part
Pb im c, the last word cs and the key KC need to be
stored in the memory. Hence, the space complexity of
Algorithm 1 is O( sv ) words. Data retrieval (Algorithm
2) and data update (Algorithm 3) retrieve k data
shares to be able to recover the key KC with space
complexity of O(s) words. Data repair retrieves O(ksv )
and data delete removes O(k2m) words.
4.2 Time Complexity
During the data dispersal process (Algorithm 1), each
data object word passes through one symmetric en-
cryption (EC) and two additions (xor), a total of
s(EC+2xor) operations. Data retrieval (Algorithm
2) consists of reverse transformations with similar
amount of operations.
Data update (Algorithm 3) starts with the retrieval
of all data parts and extraction of the key KC with
s xor operations (Algorithm 3, line 3). If ECB, OFB
or CTR block cipher modes of operation is used
(Algorithm 3, lines 6 - 11), updated data word w0i
only affects ci and cs. Hence, the scheme requires
additional (EC + 3  xor) operations. If CBC or CFB
modes of operations are used (Algorithm 3, lines
12 - 21), then all transformed words ci; : : : ; cs will
be affected. Thus, the scheme requires at average
1
s
Ps 2
i=0 (s  i  1) (EC +3xor) = (s 1)2  (EC +3
xor) operations. Additionally, the underlying (v; k; )-
SBIBD scheme can be constructed once for all data
objects in O(v) using cyclic different set method or
in O(v3=2) using mutually orthogonal Latin squares
(MOLS) [30].
Data repair and delete do not involve any trans-
formation. Therefore, the overall complexity of our
combinatorial dispersal scheme is O(s+ v).
4.3 Communication Overhead
Data dispersal (Algorithm 1) assigns k data parts to
each of v data shares. A total of k vm data words
are communicated with overall complexity of O(ks).
Data retrieval (Algorithm 2) retrieves k data shares
each having k data parts. Hence, k2 m data words
are communicated. Data repair sends k  m words
back in addition to retrieval. The overall complexity
for both algorithms is O(k
2s
v ).
Data update (Algorithm 3) first retrieves k2  m
data words to recover the key KC . If ECB, OFB
or CTR block cipher modes of operation is used,
update algorithm sends two data parts each to k
data shares, a total of 2  k  m data words with
overall complexity of O(k
2 s
v ). If CBC or CFB modes
of operations are used, update algorithm sends at
average 1v
Pj=0
v (v   j)  k m = (v+1)km2 words,
with overall complexity of O(ks).
Data delete sends O(k) requests to delete O(k2m)
words.
94.4 Correctness and Privacy Analysis
Correctness property requires that a data object can be
retrieved using Algorithm 2. Given any set A 2 A,
data shares in A possess all data parts sufficient to
reconstruct the data object through transformations
hD ; I ; C i; that is, 8A 2 A and 0  i; j < v:
Pr[f8PijPi 2 Sj ^ Sj 2 Ag          !hD ;I ;C i S] = 1:
For any set A 2 A, the monotone property of A
assures that there exists a P seti (0  i < v) such that
P seti  A. P seti is a list of all data shares which possess
the data part Pi. Due to underlying projective plane
PG(2; q), each part must be paired with all other parts
exactly once on exactly one data share (every pairs
of points lies on exactly one line). Thus, if all data
shares possessing the data part Pi are accessed, then
all data parts required to reconstruct the data object
can be retrieved. Algorithm 2 extracts the key KC , and
produces the cleartext data object.
Perfect privacy property requires that every unautho-
rized set A 2 X cannot reconstruct input data object or
any part of it. Formally, for any set A 2 X , every pair
of input data object S1 and S2, and every possible
set of data parts P set = f8PijPi 2 Sj ^ Sj 2 Ag
(0  i; j < v):
Pr[P set          !
hD ;I ;C i
S1] = Pr[P set          !
hD ;I ;C i
S2]:
Clearly, P set  fP0; : : : ; Pv 1g cannot be used to
recover the key KC . With the random choice of the
key KC , the probability of obtaining whole or portion
of input data object S is the same as that of obtaining
whole or portion of any other data object.
4.5 Security against Attacks
The adversarial model is based on the activities of the
malicious people or organizations operating storage
sites or communication networks. Objectives of an
adversary may be: (i) to obtain a data object fully
or extract partial information, (ii) to modify a data
object, (iii) to prevent a data owner to access her data
object, or (iv) remove a data object. An adversary
may perform three classes of attacks to reach these
objectives: (i) cryptographic attacks targeting the cryp-
tographic primitives EC ,KC , EI andKI , (ii) computer
attacks targeting the storage systems and the stored
data shares in the storage scenario, or (iii) network
attacks targeting the communication links and paths
in the communication scenario.
Combinatorial Data Dispersal (CDD) scheme can
adapt a number of different symmetric ciphers. Fol-
lowing the common practice today, it is recommended
to have the key jKC j  128-bit and the key jKI j  80-
bit for computational security. An adversary possess-
ing the last data part, which includes the encrypted
key KC , cannot obtain this key unless it possesses all
other data parts, which requires possession of an au-
thorized set A 2 A of data shares. Information about a
data object an adversary may obtain is limited to ksv
out of s words with a successful brute-force attach on
KC , which requires O(2jKCj) trials in the worst case. If
a user supplies an inseparability keyKI to encryptKC
as cs = KCEI [KI ; c00] : : :EI [KI ; cs 1s 1],
the adversary needs to brute-force the key KI as well.
In such a brute-force attack, each candidate key has to
be tried on s words; therefore, the complexity of the
attack will be O(2jKI j+log2(s)). Additionally, insepara-
bility transformation I enforces an order on the data
parts due to the term EI(KI ; ci  i). Given a (v,k,1)-
SBIBD with v points fP0; : : : ; Pv 1g, v! permutations
on points means v! different ways of dispersing data
parts into data shares. CDD inseparability and con-
fidentiality transformations follow the all or noth-
ing encryption and the package transform (AONT)
[29]; hence, CDD provides protection against chosen-
plaintext and related-message attacks.
Combinatorial Data Dispersal (CDD) scheme dis-
perses each data part to k distinct storage systems in
the storage scenarios. Hence, CDD is resilient against
attacks that remove up to k   1 data shares on k   1
storage systems; equivalently, CDD is resilient against
loss of data shares in any unauthorized access struc-
ture B where B 2 X . Similarly, an adversary aiming to
inject a specific data part has to do it on k storage sys-
tems. However, CDD assumes that storage systems of
data owners choice are operated by distinct competing
organizations from different geographical locations.
Such a storage system does not possess the knowledge
on other storage systems that store the rest of the
data shares. CDD inseparability and confidentiality
schemes prevent an adversary to modify a data part to
cause a meaningful change on the data object. CDD is
also resilient against the modification attacks that aim
to corrupt the data object because each storage system
possesses only one copy of a data part, and the data
owner has access to k   1 other copies of the same
data part located on other storage systems. However,
multiple adversaries may modify a sufficient number
of data parts (> k=2) in which case data owner may
not be able to decide which data part to use or she
may even be forced to use a corrupted data part. To
prevent such cases, each data part can be extended
with a message authentication code (MAC), which can
also help identify corrupted data parts. KeyKI can be
extended with the data object name and the storage
system id to provide the keys required to calculate
these MACs.
Combinatorial Data Dispersal (CDD) scheme can be
used by a source to disperse each data part through k
distinct communication links or paths to a destination.
Following the discussions above, CDD is resilient to
network packet drop attacks on up to k 1 data shares
or denial-of-service attacks on up to k 1 communica-
tion links or paths. CDD inseparability and confiden-
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tiality schemes prevent an adversary to modify a data
object; however, multiple adversaries may modify a
sufficient number of data parts (> k=2) to corrupt the
data object. Similar to the storage scenario, each data
part can be extended with a message authentication
code (MAC) using a unique key derived from KI , the
data object name and the path/link id to detect the
attack.
5 RELATED WORK AND COMPARISONS
5.1 Review of the Existing Solutions
Distribution of a data object among a set of par-
ticipants to ensure security and reliability has been
originally investigated as a secret sharing problem.
A dealer (data source) splits a secret (data object) S
into v shares fS0; : : : ; Sv 1g for v participants [35].
A secret sharing scheme is called a threshold secret
sharing scheme (a.k.a. (k; v)-threshold scheme) when
knowledge of k or more shares out of v suffices to
reconstruct the secret.
Shamir’s (k; v)-threshold scheme is based on the
polynomial interpolation [14]. It generates a polyno-
mial q(x) = S + a1x+ : : :+ ak 1xk 1 of degree k   1
where S = q(0) is set to be a shared secret. Participant
i (1  i  v) receives the share Si = q(i) (computed in
O(k)). Given any k or more shares fSi1 ; : : : ; Sikg, the
secret S can be solved using Lagrange’s interpolation
on k equations in O(k3). The overall space complex-
ities for sharing and reconstructing a secret are O(v)
and O(k), respectively. Shamir’s scheme provides per-
fect security. POTSHARDS [36] uses Shamir’s thresh-
old sharing scheme as a long-term archival storage
system.
Both Blakley’s (k; v)-threshold scheme [37] and ge-
ometric threshold scheme [38] encode a secret as a
coordinate of a point of intersection of nonparallel
lines in a hyperplane. Each participant receives a
line as its share. The overall space complexities for
sharing and reconstructing a secret are O(vk) and
O(k2), respectively, in Blakley’s scheme. PASIS [39]
uses Blakley’s (3; 7)-threshold scheme.
Erasure codes (EC) are the most widely deployed
methods to increase reliability of data in transmission
or storage. Reed-Solomon code [10], the most common
erasure code, is based on the polynomial interpolation
with the polynomial q(x) = a0 + a1x+ : : :+ ak 1xk 1
where an input message (a0; a1; : : : ; ak 1) is encoded
to q(0); q(); q(2); : : : ; q(1)). Any k-subset of the en-
coded message can be used to solve for the input
message.
Similarly, data dispersal based on Rabin’s scheme
[11] processes k data parts P = fP1; : : : ; Pkg at a
time. The scheme requires a v k invertible dispersal
matrix A. It generates v shares S = fS1; : : : ; Svg for
k data parts in O(vk) as Avk  Pk1 = Sv1. Any
k shares can be used to reconstruct data parts using
inverse dispersal matrix A kk (inverted in O(k
3)) as
A kkSk1 = Pk1 in O(k2). Performance of Rabin’s
scheme is further improved to O(v log k) for encoding
and O(k log2 k) for decoding by using techniques such
as Fermat’s number transform (FNT) and fast Fourier
transform (FFT) in [40], [41], [42], [43], [44]. The
overall encoding and decoding space complexities for
k words in Rabin’s scheme are O(v) and O(k), respec-
tively. Rabin’s scheme reduces computation, storage
and communication overhead compared to Shamir’s
scheme. However, it provides less security because
repeated data values may be used by attackers to
estimate the missing shares.
Dispersal schemes such as Rabin’s require addi-
tional encryption and signature for data protection.
Solutions in [31] and [32] encrypt a data object with
a symmetric key, disperse the key with Shamir’s
scheme, and disperse the encrypted data with Rabin’s
scheme. Another solution, AONT-RS [33], blends All-
Or-Nothing Transform (AONT) [29] with the erasure
codes. Intermemory [45], Myriad [46], Pond [47],
DHash [48], Cleversafe [49], Glacier [50], Tahoe-LAFS
[51] and FreeHaven [52] are examples of informa-
tion dispersal solutions that use erasure codes based
schemes.
LT codes [15] (a.k.a. rate-less erasure codes) provide
faster data retrieval and lower data repair overhead
at the cost of increased space complexity. LT codes
based dispersal schemes generate v data shares each
with  codes where  = sk (1   ) for   0. LT codes
randomly choose a degree d (1  d  s) for each
code, select uniformly at random d distinct data parts,
and output a code as exclusive-or (xor) of the selected
data parts. For each data object, the overall space com-
plexities for encoding and decoding are O(v) and
O(k), respectively. Encoding and decoding can be
done in O(dv)  O( vks ln s) and O(dk)  O(s ln s)
xor operations, respectively [16]. The drawback of
this scheme is that the encoded data parts can be
recovered with a certain probability. Plank et al. [53]
experimentally showed that LT codes perform well
only asymptotically.
Cao et al. [16] presents an exhaustive search method
to generate deterministic LT codes. Following data
encoding, all possible k-combination of encoded data
are checked for decodability in O((vk) kd). If any
combination fails, data is re-encoded. Wang [54] com-
bined belief propagation decoding process with the
edge colored graph models for deterministic LT codes
but could not generalize the result. Raptor code [55]
uses error correcting codes on input data parts before
application of LT codes. Growth code [56] uses LT
codes to prevent loss of data due to failing nodes in
a sensor network.
Network coding (NC) [17] is a bandwidth reduction
technique where each node in a communication net-
work forwards only a linear combination of received
messages. Receiver solves a set of linear equations
to reconstruct the original message. In a random NC
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[57], each node transmits a random linear combination
of received messages. Distributed storage solutions
using NC [12], [18], [19], [58], [59] permit multiple
data sources and improve data transfer time perfor-
mance. In [5], NC is used along with homomorphic
fingerprinting to be able to locate and eliminate incor-
rect data shares at the receiver. In [13], NC is used to
disperse encrypted messages to storage servers, and
threshold sharing is used to disperse the encryption
key to trusted key storage servers. Champel et al. [60]
combines LT codes with NC for decentralization.
Modular coding (MC) schemes divide a secret into
a set of v congruence equations S  Pi mod Mi
(0  i < v) so that any k congruences can be
solved using Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to
recover the secret [20], [21], [22]. For a unique solution,
M0 < : : : < Mv 1 should be picked as relatively prime
positive integers where
Qv 1
i=v k+1Mi < S <
Qk 1
i=0 Mi
[21]. For each data object part, MC has computation
and space complexities of O(v) modular multipli-
cation, inversion and exponentiation operations for
encoding and O(k) for decoding.
The multiple assignment scheme (MAS) [25] [26]
constructs a set of v data shares fS0; : : : ; Sv 1g such
that any k data shares can be used to recover the
data object. The scheme first generates the set B =
fB0; : : : ; Bb 1g consisting of all possible k  1 subsets
of v data shares where b =
 
v
k 1

. Each data share
Si (0  i < v) receives the sets of data parts
fPj jSi =2 Bjg (0  j < b). In its basic form, MAS stores
O(
 
v 1
k 1

v sb )  O(vs) data parts for a data object with
s parts. Hence, computation and space complexities
are O(vs) for encoding and O(
 
v 1
k 1

k sb )  O(ks) for
decoding.
MAS security requires the data object to pass
through All-Or-Nothing (AONT) [29] or XOR based
inseparability transformation before dispersal. While
AONT has higher computational complexity, XOR
scheme has a space blow-up problem. MAS with XOR
splits each data word wi into b parts fP0; : : : ; Pb 1g
where wi = P1  : : :  Pb. Hence, MAS creates
b =
 
v
k 1

data parts for each word and stores total of
O(
 
v 1
k 1

vs) data parts for a data object with s words.
Computation and space complexity for encoding is
O(
 
v 1
k 1

vs) and for decoding is O(
 
v 1
k 1

ks). Grid-
Sharing [23] is an example solution that uses MAS.
5.2 Comparison with the Existing Solutions
Table 2 compares the presented and existing data
dispersal schemes based on their complexity. All so-
lutions provide (k; v) threshold scheme where an
authorized set of k data shares out of v can reconstruct
the data object with s words but less than k cannot
provide any information. For comparability, dispersal
parameters are set as k = O(q), v = O(q2) (q is a
prime or prime power) and s  v for all solutions.
Storage complexity (or storage blow-up) represents
the total size of v data shares in words. Computation
and communication complexity results are calculated
for dispersal of s data object words and their retrieval
using k data shares. Combinatorial data dispersal and
multiple assignment schemes are the only schemes
which do not involve mathematical transformations
on data object words.
Shamir’s scheme provides perfect security. Other
data dispersal schemes exhibit weaknesses due to
possible repetitions and known structures within a
data object. Hence, these schemes require data object
to pass through an XOR encryption in O(ds) or All-
Or-Nothing Transform (AONT) in O(s) prior to data
dispersal. The results show that the proposed combi-
natorial data dispersal scheme has clear advantages as
it exhibits lowest storage, computation and commu-
nication overhead, and it can provide strong security
using AONT or XOR encryption.
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
The combinatorial and existing data dispersal
schemes are implemented in C++/STL and tested
on an Intel i7 3.4GHz desktop Windows 7 computer
with 8GB memory. Input data objects of sizes 1KB,
10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB and 1GB are used.
Data objects are dispersed into v = 7 shares and
k = 3 shares are collected to retrieve each data
object. In all schemes, except the modular codes,
arithmetic operations such as additions, scalar and
matrix multiplications and inversions are carried
out in GF (256) with the primitive polynomial
x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. Time values listed in Table 3
and Fig. 5 are measured using C++ clock() function
which returns the total number of clock ticks (clock
ticks per second is 1000 for this computer). Only
core dispersal methods are considered for precise
evaluation of the dispersal schemes. Cost of AES
encryption (128-bit input block, 128-bit key and ECB
mode) excluding file and screen I/O is measured and
provided separately in Table 3 because it is common
to all dispersal schemes except Shamir’s, MAS (XOR)
and Comb (XOR).
In Shamir’s scheme, each data object is dispersed
byte-by-byte bases. In Erasure code (EC), k bytes
of a data object is dispersed at a time. Dispersal
matrix Akk is inverted in GF (256) once for each
data object. Network code (NC) functions in a similar
manner as EC except a data source disperses less
shares (k instead of v) due to NC’s distributed nature.
LT codes disperse 32 bytes of blocks at a time with
 = 32. For each one of v codes, degree d is
randomly (non-uniform) drawn from interval [1; s].
For the first block, v codes are randomly selected
and exhaustively tested for decodability [16]. Once a
decodable code is found, the same code is used for
the rest of the data object. The multiple assignment
scheme (MAS) is implemented both with and without
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TABLE 2: Comparison of the data dispersal schemes
Dispersal Scheme Applications ComplexitySpace Computation Communication
Shamir’s Scheme [14], [36] O(vs) O(vks+ k3s) O(vs+ ks)
Blakley’s Scheme [37], [39] O(vks) O(vks+ k3s) O(vks+ k2s)
Erasure Codes [10], [11], [45], [46], [47], [48] O( vsk ) O(vs+ k
3 + ks) O( vsk + s)[33], [49], [50], [51], [52]
Network Coding [17], [19], [57], [59] O( vs
k
) O(2ks+ k3) O( vs
k
+ s)
LT codes [15], [16] O(v) O(vd+
 
v
k

kd+ kd) O(v+ k)
Multiple Assignment [23], [26] O(
 
v 1
k 1

vs) O(
 
v 1
k 1

vs+
 
v 1
k 1

ks) O(
 
v 1
k 1

vs+
 
v 1
k 1

ks)
Modular Coding [20], [21], [22] O(vs) O(vs+ ks) O(vs+ ks)
Combinatorial (Our work) - O(ks) O(s+ v) O(ks+ k
2s
v
)
XOR encryption. In modular coding (MC), each data
object is processed byte-by-byte bases. The smallest
possible moduli (7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23 and 29) are
selected for the best performance. However, modulus
values should be much bigger for improved security
which results in additional computational overhead
for modular exponentiation and inversion.
TABLE 3: Experimental Results
Dispersal (Encoding) Time (sec)
10KB 1MB 100MB 1GB
Shamir 0.3735 38.4159 3890.3240 38628.7059
EC 0.0830 8.5672 854.4955 8309.6780
NC 0.0358 3.7080 372.1700 3647.9470
LT 0.0447 3.0211 318.0845 3040.4060
MAS(XOR) 0.0191 1.9551 196.1123 1950.0742
Comb:(XOR) 0.0038 0.3862 38.3152 384.2225
MAS 0.0007 0.0745 7.5239 75.0960
Modular 0.0005 0.0505 5.0251 50.5033
Combinatorial 0.0003 0.0328 3.2297 32.7282
Retrieval (Decoding) Time (sec)
Shamir 0.2362 16.3598 1630.7590 16314.1540
EC 0.1113 3.7526 368.7325 3836.8980
NC 0.1111 3.7646 368.0480 3618.4150
LT 0.0250 2.5063 261.8010 2443.6950
MAS(XOR) 0.0134 1.3698 136.0332 1365.7995
Comb:(XOR) 0.0014 0.1431 14.4084 143.1235
MAS 0.0006 0.0602 5.9547 60.4700
Modular 0.0003 0.0352 3.6358 36.2143
Combinatorial 0.0001 0.0133 1.3570 13.5846
Encryption Overhead (sec)
AESEncryption 0.0110 0.4960 47.5270 486.1930
(*) Our work (CDD) presented in this paper.
Our combinatorial data dispersal (CDD) scheme
processes v data object bytes at a time to generate v
data shares. The block design used in CDD is gener-
ated using difference set method presented in Section
2. Additionally, CDD scheme with XOR encryption
is implemented and compared with MAS with XOR
encryption.
Table 2 compares space, computation and commu-
nication complexities in asymptotic notations. Table
3 and Fig. 5 present the experimental results for
the dispersal and retrieval algorithms for each data
dispersal scheme excluding the encryption which is
provided separately. Repair, update and delete algo-
rithms simply use dispersal and retrieval algorithms
at data word, data part, data share or data object level.
For example, update of a data word requires access
to k storage systems (retrieval) to extract the key and
disperse of the updated word (dispersal of a single
word).
Results in Tables 2 and 3 and Fig. 5 show that our
CDD provides much shorter computation, communi-
cation and storage overhead compared to all other
schemes. CDD provides much faster dispersal and
retrieval than MAS. Unlike MAS, CDD can scale-up as
the number of data shares increases. When the cost of
AES encryption is added to the measurements in Table
3, CDD using XOR encryption performs the best,
followed by CDD with AES encryption. CDD consists
of the confidentiality transform using EC with KC
which provides confidentiality for each dispersed data
part and the inseparability transform optionally using
EI with user stored key KI which ensures that the
data object can only be accessed by the owner. EC and
EI can be both AES. On top of its advantage in space
and communication complexity, CDD with double
AES encryption still performs significantly better than
MAS (XOR), LT, NC and EC with AES encryption and
Shamir’s scheme. Hence, CDD presented in this paper
constitutes the best candidate for data dispersal in
low power, high data rate and time critical networked
systems.
6 CONCLUSIONS
A novel combinatorial data dispersal (CDD) scheme
has been presented in this paper. It uses point and line
incidence relations from a projective plane PG(2,q)
to disperse parts of a data object to v data shares
in distributed storage and multilink/multipath com-
munication scenarios. Extensive formal analysis and
experimental evaluation on both CDD and existing
dispersal schemes show that CDD provides the lowest
storage, computation and communication overhead.
Hence, it is particularly suitable for dispersal of small
to large scale block or stream data generated and
consumed by low power devices such as sensors,
embedded computers or smartphones in time critical
networked systems. CDD provides strong security
with integration of XOR encryption or all-or-nothing
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Fig. 5: Experimental Results: comparison of dispersal
and retrieval times.
inseparability transformation. XOR encryption has
low computation overhead but has a storage blow-
up problem. Hence, the focus of our ongoing study
is to extend CDD with combinatorial XOR networks
to provide strong security at a lower computation
and storage overhead. Future work will also investi-
gate distributed deterministic data dispersal schemes
which can be used by a set of data sources collab-
oratively to disperse their data to a data sink with
possible applications in sensor networks and internet
of things.
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